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Abstract 
 
In this study, we propose a set of covariates that exploit information content of hedge funds’ relative 
size, performance, growth, tail risk, and past liquidation rate, in predicting their liquidation. Empirical 
results show that our proposed covariates exhibit significant predictive power for up to two years even 
when we control for fund specific characteristics. Furthermore, we estimate separate liquidation 
prediction models for small, medium, and large funds. Our findings suggest that liquidation likelihood 
of hedge funds is inversely related to fund size, and statistical significance of factors affecting their 
liquidation vary across different size categories.  
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1. Introduction 
The hedge fund industry has experienced difficult times recently, with tense global 
macroeconomic conditions, high market volatility, enhanced regulatory vigilance, and 
underperformance relative to traditional asset classes. These factors may have contributed 
towards the closing down of funds at an increasing rate in recent years (see Table 1). 
Strikingly, some of the biggest names have also been affected by this phenomenon. In 
September 2016, after almost three decades of operation, Perry Capital announced the closure 
of its flagship fund, just as its predecessor Long Term Capital Management had done in 1998, 
and Amaranth Advisors had done in 2006. This subsequently raises concerns and scepticism 
regarding the role of Hedge Funds in financial markets. While the literature broadly agrees on 
the role of hedge funds in providing liquidity and risk sharing to financial markets, 
contrarians argue that the nature of their risk exposure increasingly contributes towards 
systematic risk and financial instability (e.g. Billio et al., 2012). 
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Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds enjoy regulatory exemptions and greater flexibility in 
investment strategies, and are characterized by managing investment portfolios that promise 
high return but are coupled with high risk. Most of the empirical literature emphasises fund 
failure due to market risk (e.g. LTCM and Amaranth), however failure may also be attributed 
to sudden withdrawal of funds (e.g. Peloton) or high operational risk (e.g. Bayou). Another 
failure possibility may be persistent poor performance, which may motivate investors to 
withdraw funds over a period of time, eventually leading to smaller fund sizes which become 
difficult to manage profitably, and are hence closed down. Kim (2009) argues that if failure is 
triggered due to an external shock, then there is no reason why a fund should exhibit poor 
performance before the shock. However, if failure is triggered due to persistent past poor 
performance over a period of time, then we have strong motivation to believe that poor 
performance may lead to higher default probability. As hedge funds are often characterized 
by investment in high risk illiquid assets, such persistent poor performance may force fund 
managers to change the investment policy to meet any unforeseen redemption demands. They 
may therefore end up avoiding profitable trading options and investing in less profitable 
liquid assets to meet sudden redemption demands. In the worst cases, funds may need to 
dilute some illiquid positions, which may be costly and dampen performance. Redemption of 
funds by investors can also trigger a run among investors, leading to funds’ failure. Agarwal 
et al. (2015) argue that there could be a liquidity mismatch between funds-of-hedge funds 
and their underlying hedge funds, and this mismatch can transmit outflows across the hedge 
fund industry. Due to certain characteristics of the hedge fund industry (e.g. lock-up periods, 
redemption notices), hedge fund investors and managers can be caught in strategic games in 
which it is optimal to withdraw funds, even if no external shock has occurred. Teo (2011) 
shows that a liquidity mismatch between the funding liquidity and the portfolio held by funds 
can lead to such failures. A theoretical framework for such runs is provided by Brunnermeier 
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and Pedersen (2009). Recent literature also highlights the impact of past poor performance on 
hedge funds’ failure (see among others Liang, 2000; Brown et al., 2002; Grecu et al., 2007), 
however examination of the effect of fund size on such failures is yet to be debated. 
Is fund size a major driver of hedge funds’ liquidation? How do other fund 
characteristics interplay with fund size in predicting the default likelihood of hedge funds?  
These are the primary questions we examine in this study. Although a handful of prior studies 
have examined the impact of size on hedge fund performance (e.g. Teo, 2009), its impact on 
funds’ failure is yet to be empirically debated. Among the few studies that explore the 
relationship between fund size and performance, a consensus is yet to be reached. Aggarwal 
and Jorion (2009) show that young and small hedge funds outperform bigger, older ones. A 
similar relationship between performance and assets under management has also been 
reported in the mutual fund industry (e.g. Indro et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2004). Liang (1999) 
also reports a positive relationship between average hedge fund returns and funds’ assets 
under management, and attributes this to the increasing benefits that arise through economies 
of scale. However, Getmansky (2012) argues that there is an optimum asset size that 
maximizes returns, as she finds positive and concave relationships between fund size and 
performance. Getmansky (2012) thus suggests that investors should be wary of hedge fund 
size before investing, and advises them to try investing in funds close to their optimum size. 
Perold and Salomon Jr (1991) also explain that there is an optimal size for investors: if a fund 
is too small, the fixed costs of running the fund are too high, and if a fund is too large, the 
liquidity issues and capacity constraints will reduce its performance. This is also confirmed 
by the findings of Yin (2016). He reports positive relationship between fund managers’ 
compensation and fund asset growth, and finds that managers’ allow fund size to grow 
beyond optimal size for performance to achieve a much larger fund size that maximizes their 
compensation. Gregoriou and Rouah (2002), on the contrary, report no relationship between 
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fund size and performance. However, there appears to be reasonable evidence of an inverse 
relationship between hedge fund performance and size. Even if size provides more fund 
security, its negative impact on performance can counterbalance this effect and lead to a 
higher risk of failure. Small hedge funds generally outperform large ones, but they are 
comparatively riskier with a higher attrition rate (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2009). Furthermore, 
they are more fragile with respect to investors’ outflows. 
Our study contributes to this debate by adding the likelihood of liquidation to the fund 
managers’ trade-off literature. If size has a strong impact on the probability of closing a fund, 
then managers can choose to let the fund grow even if it hurts the performance (and so 
decreases their performance fees), because they want to limit their failure risk. Indeed, Lan et 
al. (2013) explain that hedge fund managers trade off the benefits of taking more risks and 
improving performance against the cost of fund liquidation. As actualized future management 
fees account for the majority of managers’ compensation, managers prefer to enhance funds’ 
survival likelihood instead of increasing its performance. Furthermore, Kim (2016b) also 
reports the presence of size and value effects in equity hedge funds. We update the growing 
literature on hedge funds by developing comprehensive liquidation prediction models to 
assess the impact of funds’ size on their default probability. In line with our prior discussion, 
we expect small funds to be more vulnerable to adverse changes in fund characteristics than 
their larger counterparts. All else being equal, we consider fund size to have a significant 
impact on hedge funds’ liquidation risk. 
An additional contribution made by this study is that we propose several new covariates 
to explain hedge funds’ liquidation. For the first time, we explore information content of 
funds’ relative size (WRSIZE), growth in assets under management (GROWTH), total value 
of downside and upside returns (DRATIO), volatility of tail risk (TRISK), and past 
liquidation rate of hedge funds (INDRISK) in predicting liquidation likelihood of hedge 
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funds. Some of these covariates are motivated from studies on corporate bankruptcy by 
Campbell et al. (2008) and Gupta et al. (2017), however they are suitably modified to fit the 
purposes of this study. Following the existing literature, we also investigate the 
discriminatory power of funds’ own performance (RETURN) and their past 60 months 
winning ratio (WRATIO) in predicting hedge funds’ liquidation. Section 2.3.2 provides 
further details on these covariates. We also employ a set of control variables to account for 
inherent variabilities in fund characteristics, such as high-water mark, leverage, age, 
investment style and personal capital. Section 2.3.3 presents the comprehensive list of control 
variables along with their respective definitions. 
We perform our empirical analysis using the most comprehensive Lipper (TASS) 
hedge fund database, which contains information about live and defunct (graveyard) funds. 
Our study covers a sampling period between January 1995 and December 2016. A fund may 
exit the database for several reasons (see Section 2.3.1), however liquidation seems to be the 
most reasonable cause of funds’ failure/exit (e.g. Baquero et al., 2005). In this study we 
consider only liquidated funds to define our failure/exit definition, as liquidation is expected 
to have the highest adverse impact on stakeholders among all exit reasons, and thus the most 
costly form of fund exit. Additionally, to capture any non-linearity in the effects of covariates 
that may arise due to fund size, we use criteria based on funds’ assets under management 
(AUM) to classify small, medium and large funds. We consider funds corresponding to the 
bottom 25 percentile of AUM as small funds, those in the top 25 percentile as large funds, 
and the rest medium funds. 
Our empirical analysis begins by establishing the discriminatory power of our proposed 
covariates in identifying liquidated and non-liquidated funds for our entire sample of hedge 
funds. Using panel logistic regression techniques we estimate regression models for 6 
months, 12 months, and 24 months lagged time periods. Test results prove that all our 
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proposed covariates are strongly significant in explaining liquidation risk of hedge funds 
across all three lagged time periods. These results also remain unchanged when the models 
are re-estimated by supplementing control variables. This proves the complementary 
information content of our proposed covariates, and their statistical significance up to the 24 
months lagged period establishes their intertemporal predictive ability. 
We next turn our attention to assessing the impact of funds’ size on their liquidation 
likelihood. An initial inspection of their hazard curves for different size categories reveals 
compelling evidence that there is significant influence of fund size on liquidation likelihood. 
As reported in Figure 1, small funds are most vulnerable to the risk of liquidation, followed 
by medium and then large funds. This is in line with the arguments of Aggarwal and Jorion 
(2009), who also raise similar concerns. The almost flat survival and hazard curves of large 
funds suggest that liquidation is a rare phenomenon for them, and they are not as vulnerable 
as small and medium firms to the risk of liquidation. This offers a very strong and clear 
indication that factors affecting hedge fund liquidation are expected to vary, in terms of their 
significance or magnitude of coefficients, across the size categories. 
Based on our empirical analysis, we conclude that factors affecting liquidation risk of 
hedge funds vary across different size categories. While failure of small and medium funds is 
explained by a broad set of variables (WRSIZE, GROWTH, RETURN, WRATIO, DRATIO, 
TRISK and INDRISK), for large funds, only two variables (WRATO and DRATIO) show 
significant explanatory power. Broadly, magnitudes of respective regression coefficients for 
small and medium funds are marginally higher compared to estimates obtained for all funds. 
This suggests small and medium-sized funds are marginally more vulnerable to changes in 
factors or fund characteristics in comparison to estimates obtained for all funds. 
Insignificance of covariates in explaining liquidation of large funds, and their significance in 
explaining liquidation of small and medium funds, might imply that small and medium-sized 
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funds have dominant influence on regression estimates, and estimates obtained by employing 
the entire sample of hedge funds are essentially biased. Thus, we present compelling 
evidence that respective coefficients of different significant predictors are not equal among 
different size groups of hedge funds, confirming non-linear relationships between predictors 
of liquidation and size. This is further reaffirmed when we include main effects and 
interaction effects of fund size and investment style into our regression model for all funds. A 
dummy variable for large funds, and interaction terms involving medium funds and 
investment style, enter significantly into our multivariate models. Thus, an appropriate 
modelling approach of fund liquidation should take into account the size of funds considered.  
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents 
discussion on our dataset and sample used in this study; Section 3 presents our empirical 
methods; Sections 4, 5 and 6 present and discuss our regression results; and Section 7 
concludes this study. 
2. Dataset, Sample and Covariates 
The hedge fund data used in our empirical analysis comes from the Lipper (TASS) 
hedge fund database. Although a comprehensive fund-level database, it is not a true 
representation of the entire hedge funds universe. However, using a consolidation of the five 
largest commercial hedge fund databases, including Lipper (TASS), Joenväärä et al. (2016) 
find no difference in performance among different databases. Thus, we expect our analysis to 
be a true representation of the hedge funds universe. However, two popular known biases in 
hedge funds literature, survivorship bias and backfill bias, need to be mitigated before 
performing any empirical analysis. To account for survivorship bias, we restrict our sample 
range to January 1995 and December 2016, and include funds that exit the database during 
this time period. To mitigate the effect of backfill bias (Malkiel and Saha, 2005), we follow 
an approach similar to Yin (2016) and exclude data before the date when funds were added to 
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the TASS database. If the date added to TASS information is not available, we exclude the 
first 18 months of observations from our analysis. Additionally, our analysis considers only 
those funds that report their return on a monthly basis (net of fees and trading costs) and 
excludes funds that report at any other frequencies. 
Following Liang and Park (2010) we exclude emerging market funds to avoid any 
specific investment style from dominating the highest risk group in each time-spell. We also 
exclude funds that report financial information in currency other than United States Dollar 
(USD). Since our analysis is strictly focused on hedge funds, we exclude fund-of-funds (to 
avoid double counting) and managed futures (CTAs) from our analysis, as Liang (2004) 
reports that managed futures differ from hedge funds in several respects. We consider the 
following investment styles to analyse the hedge fund failure: equity market neutral, 
convertible arbitrage, event driven, fixed income arbitrage, dedicated short bias, long/short 
equity hedge, global macro, and multi-strategies. 
2.1 Defining Small, Medium and Large Funds 
In the absence of any formal definition, we use criteria based on funds’ assets under 
management (AUM) to classify small, medium, and large funds. Specifically, we consider 
funds corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of AUM as small funds, the top 25 percentile 
as large funds, and the rest medium funds. This gives us 49,109 fund-month observations for 
small funds, 101,144 fund-month observations for medium sized funds, and 51,425 fund-
month observations for large funds. This subsequently leads to 1,923 small funds, 2,675 
medium funds, and 1,229 large funds in our sample (see last row of Table 1). One should also 
consider that some funds may appear in more than one size category, but in different time 
periods. This is due to the changing AUM of funds. A fund may start small, but eventually 
move to the medium or large sized categories as its AUM increases, or vice versa. 
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2.2 Sample Description 
Table 1 presents yearly liquidation rates of hedge funds from 1995 to 2016. To observe 
any differences between size categories, we also report the yearly liquidation rates of small, 
medium, and large funds. The average liquidation rate of our entire sample is 4.26%, this is 
about one-third of  the overall attrition rate (around 12%) reported in recent literature (e.g. 
Haghani, 2014), and close to the liquidation rate (5.2%) reported by Baquero et al. (2005). 
The seminal study on hedge funds failure by Liang and Park (2010) does not report average 
of annual liquidation rates. However, their sample contains 15.32% of liquidated funds (327 
liquidated out of 2134 funds for the sample period from January 1995 to December 2004), 
which is close to the percentage of liquidated funds in our sample (13.99%) for similar 
sampling period.  
As expected, the average liquidation rate is highest for small funds (7.53%), followed 
by medium funds (2.77%), and lowest for large funds (1.02%). Further, we see in Table 1 
that liquidation rate is inversely related to fund size. In any given year, the percentage of 
liquidated funds is highest for small funds and lowest for large funds. The liquidation rates of 
all funds experienced a significant rise around the financial crisis of 2007-08, but from 2012 
onwards they gradually began to moderate. However, unlike small and medium sized funds, 
the liquidation rates of large funds did not rise dramatically during the crisis period. This may 
suggest that large funds have significantly higher shock absorbing capacity than their smaller 
counterparts, and that they are also better prepared for any forthcoming event that threatens 
their degree of solvency. 
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[Insert Table 1 Here] 
2.3 Selection of Variables 
In this section we discuss the rationale behind our choice of dependent variable, 
followed by relevant discussion on explanatory and control variables employed in this study. 
2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The life of a hedge fund in the TASS database may be summarized as follows. First, the 
fund is started (inception date). Then, the fund may enter the database (date added) and start 
voluntary reporting of required information on a recurring basis. Subsequently, the fund may 
exit the database, and the date corresponding to the latest available information is equivalent 
to its exit/failure date. A fund may exit the database due to one of the following reasons: (1) 
liquidation; (2) no longer reporting to TASS; (3) TASS being unable to contact the manager 
for updated information; (4) closure to new investment; (5) merging into another entity; (6) 
becoming dormant; or (7) unknown. Among all of these exit reasons, liquidation seems to be 
the most reasonable cause of funds’ failure/exit (e.g. Baquero et al., 2005), however recent 
literature also argues that considering liquidation as the only cause of failure is inappropriate, 
and suggests that other defunct funds should also be included in the failure universe (Liang 
and Park, 2010). 
There are two potential reasons why a fund may stop voluntary reporting. First, due to 
poor performance, managers may decide to evade voluntary reporting, which subsequently 
leads to selection bias and results in the superior performance of funds that voluntarily report 
their performance to commercial databases in comparison to non-reporting funds (Aiken et 
al., 2013). Alternatively, the fund may be liquidated, merged, or closed due to poor 
performance. A fund manager may also evade voluntary reporting if the fund performs well, 
and they decide to close it to new investors. If the fund seeks new investors, it continues 
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reporting and its performance information is made available to commercial databases. Thus, 
fund managers who choose to report until filing for liquidation may take an ethical stand to 
present their true performance in front of their investors, irrespective of the level of 
performance. Moreover, fund managers who choose to exit the database for reasons other 
than liquidation might make a strategic choice to hide poor performance. However, in this 
study we consider only liquidated funds to define our failure/exit definition, as liquidation is 
expected to have highest adverse impact on stakeholders and generally the costliest form of 
exit. 
2.3.2 Main Explanatory Variables 
An additional contribution of this paper is that we propose several new covariates 
(WRSIZE, GROWTH, DRATIO, TRISK and INDRISK) to explain hedge funds’ liquidation. 
These covariates are novel to hedge funds’ failure literature and exploit information content 
of funds’ relative size, average growth, past performance, volatility of tail risk, and past 
liquidation rate, to predict hedge funds’ liquidation for up to two years. Some of these 
covariates are adapted from previous studies on corporate bankruptcy by Gupta et al. (2017) 
and Campbell et al. (2008), but are suitably modified to fit the scope of this study. Further 
details on all main covariates are as follows: 
WRSIZE – Logarithm of past 12 months’ weighted average of each fund’s size relative to the 
total size of all funds for a given investment style in month t, calculated as: 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−12 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 1 − ∅1 − ∅12 (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ ∅11𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−12)�                    (1) 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�                                        (2) 
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Here, ∅ = 2−13 (two raised to the power negative of one over three), implying that the weight 
is halved each month. AUM is assets under management in millions of USD.  
A fund sufficiently close to liquidation is typically discounted by investors, and thus 
fund size is expected to bear a negative relationship to liquidation likelihood. This 
relationship might also be affected by a fund’s relative market share. The likelihood that large 
funds would recover from their distressed state or may delay their liquidation filing is high, 
compared with small funds. Moreover, small funds might be more vulnerable to industry 
competition, and unfavourable political and policy changes. Thus, unlike previous studies, we 
use relative size of funds rather than their absolute values.  It is also reasonable to assume 
that a long history of losses or sustained decline in funds’ AUM would be a superior 
predictor of funds’ liquidation than one large monthly/quarterly/annual loss or a sudden 
decline in AUM. Therefore, we impose geometrically declining weights on RSIZE as stated 
in Equation 1 and expect it to be inversely related to probability of funds’ liquidation. 
GROWTH – Weighted average of the past 12 months percentage change in AUM of a given 
fund i, calculated as: 
𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−12 = 1 − ∅1 − ∅12 (ln (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−2) + ⋯+ ∅11ln (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−12/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−13))                (4) 
Here too, ∅ = 2−13 (two raised to the power negative of one over three), implying that the 
weight is halved in each successive month. Weight is expected to bear an inverse relationship 
to funds’ liquidation likelihood, as funds sufficiently close to liquidation might witness 
negative growth due to the withdrawal of funds and/or decline in inflow of new funds. Like 
WRSIZE, here too we assume that a long history of funds growth in AUM would be a 
superior predictor of funds’ liquidation than a monthly/quarterly/annual growth rate. Thus, 
we calculate GROWTH as the weighted average of monthly growth rates of AUM over the 
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past twelve months. Further, to give more importance to recent growth in AUM, we impose 
geometrically declining weights as stated in Equation 4. 
RETURN – Geometric mean of the past 12 months rate of return. 
WRATIO – Winning ratio over the past 60 months, calculated by dividing the number of 
months a fund reported positive returns in the past 60 months by 60. Although we expect it to 
have a negative relationship with funds’ liquidation probability, funds might also choose to 
exit the database due to superior performance or persistent higher winning ratios. They might 
choose not to report to TASS when they perform poorly, or given insufficient reporting 
incentives above their superior performance. This in turn might lead to a positive relationship 
between winning ratio and liquidation likelihood. One might also need to consider that funds 
might continue to generate positive returns while simultaneously reducing their AUM. A few 
recent studies do not include winning ratios in their failure prediction models (Liang and 
Park, 2010; Haghani, 2014; Kim 2016a), while others report positive (e.g. Baba and Goko, 
2009) and negative (e.g. Lee and Yao, 2015) relationships between winning ratio and failure 
likelihood of hedge funds. Irrespective of the sign of its coefficients, we find it highly 
significant in all our multivariate models and thus have included it in our study. 
DRATIO – Natural logarithm of past 60 months d-ratio. Adapted from Bacon (2008, page 
95), the d-ratio measures the ratio of the total value of downside returns (less than 0) 
compared with the total value of upside returns (greater than 0): 
𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺 = ln (𝑓𝑓-𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �−𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 × ∑ min (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, 0)𝑖𝑖=𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢 × ∑ max (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, 0)𝑖𝑖=𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �                                        (5) 
Here, 𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 is the number of returns less than 0 and 𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢 is the number of returns greater than 0. 
The d-ratio will have values between zero and infinity, and can be used to rank the 
performance of hedge funds. The lower the value of d-ratio the better the performance; a 
value of zero indicates that there are no returns less than zero, and a value of infinity 
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indicates that there are no returns greater than zero. Thus, fund managers with positively 
skewed returns will have lower d-ratio and face lower liquidation likelihood. Considering the 
extreme positive values that d-ratio might undertake, we use its natural logarithm (DRATIO) 
to offset any extreme biasness that might arise due to its extreme positive skewness. 
One might expect DRATIO to be strongly correlated to WRATIO as both their 
constructs are centred on the idea of fund managers’ ability to generate positive returns. 
However, the correlation between them is about -0.22 (see Table 3), signifying sufficient 
complementarity between these two measures. WRATIO just considers the count of positive 
returns, while DRATIO considers the value/magnitude of both positive and negative returns 
generated. If two funds report an exact number of positive returns in a given duration, they 
will have identical values of WRATIO. In this situation, an appropriate decision could be 
made by comparing their DRATIOs.    
TRISK – Tail risk, measured as standard deviation of monthly Expected Shortfall estimated 
over the past 60 months.  
Tail risk measures, namely Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES), are 
increasingly considered when predicting hedge funds’ failure (e.g. Liang and Park, 2010; Lee 
and Yao 2015). Liang and Park (2010) are the first to explore the discriminatory power of 
downside risk measures (semideviation, VaR, ES and standard deviation of losses larger than 
VaR (TR)) in predicting hedge funds’ failure, and conclude that these measures are superior 
to standard deviation as a risk measure. Among downside risk measures, they suggest that ES 
and TR are superior to VaR and semideviation. Theoretical superiority of ES  to VaR as a 
risk measure is well documented in the literature as well (see Righi and Ceretta (2016) for 
additional discussion), however superiority of TR as a risk measure over ES is still an active 
area of scholarly debate (see Righi and Ceretta, 2016). ES represents the mean of losses 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
larger than VaR, while TR measures the standard deviation of losses larger than VaR, and 
thus TR is better than ES in capturing tail risk (Liang and Park, 2010). However, our 
inspection of ES and TR reveals inconsistent results across lagged periods in univariate and 
multivariate regression models1.  This inconsistency might be because these measures 
include only losses larger than VaR, and thus a low number of observations being used in 
computing ES and TR, as we employ monthly returns for computing these measures. Overall, 
we conclude that the statistical significance of VaR, ES, and TR show some inconsistency in 
predicting hedge funds’ liquidation and thus might not be the most appropriate choice. 
However, the variable TRISK that we propose is highly significant in both univariate and 
multivariate regression models, and thus a consistent predictor of hedge funds’ liquidation 
likelihood.  
In this study, ES represents the mean of losses larger than Cornish-Fisher Value-at-Risk 
(see Liang and Park, 2010) and TRISK aims to capture the volatility of ES. A higher value of 
ES implies a higher likelihood of failure, but a higher value of its standard deviation might 
not imply the same. Hedge funds are known for undertaking risky investments, and thus fund 
managers generally have a predetermined loss expectation (or expected tolerance level). The 
deviation from the expected tolerance level shall be higher when the liquidation risk is low 
and the fund manager is optimistic about the future profitability. This shall lead to higher 
                                                 
1 Our inspection of Cornish-Fisher Value-at-Risk (VaR) in predicting hedge funds’ liquidation revealed mixed 
results. In the univariate regression, VaR is a statistically significant predictor for up to two years, but witnesses 
sign reversal of its coefficient (from positive to negative) in the multivariate setup. Next we estimate univariate 
regressions using ES as an explanatory variable, and find it insignificant for 6 months lagged estimates, but 
significant for 12 and 24 months lagged estimates. It enters significantly in the multivariate models but 
witnesses sign reversal similar to VaR, and makes a couple of other variables insignificant. Additionally, Lee 
and Yao (2015) (estimates using panel logistic regression technique) and Liang and Park (2010) (see Panel B of 
Table 3) report ES as an insignificant predictor of hedge funds’ failure/liquidation. Arguably TR is superior to 
ES, but our regression results do not support this claim. We find TR as a highly insignificant predictor across all 
lagged periods in both univariate and multivariate regression models. This might be strongly contrary to the 
findings of Liang and Park (2010), however they report weak significance of TR in their multivariate model 
reported in Table 5. Results for this analysis are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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deviations from ES and thus higher standard deviation of ES when the fund is doing well or 
facing a lower threat of liquidation.  
On the contrary, a fund manager facing the threat of liquidation in the near future is 
expected to turn conservative/risk-neutral, and avoid large deviations from the expected 
tolerance level or ES. This is in line with the findings of Kelly and Jiang (2014).  They report 
that hedge funds earn a risk premium for being exposed to tail risk, and thus fund managers 
might try to minimize it while facing threats of liquidation. Moreover, a risk-neutral manager 
has incentives to preserve a fund’s going-concern value so as to maintain fees income in the 
future (Lan et al., 2013). Thus, large deviations from ES might aggravate the liquidation risk 
and cause the fund’s closure earlier than expected. This explanation is also in line with the 
theoretical explanation of hedge funds’ endogenous risk-taking behaviour by Lan et al. 
(2013). They argue that, when hedge funds’ failure is costly to its manager in reputational 
terms, it can be shown that most of their compensation comes from management fees. This 
implies that, in periods of stress, when the likelihood of failure is high, fund managers will 
reduce their exposure to risk in order to maximize their chances to earn future management 
fees.  
Thus, funds facing liquidation risk are expected to have lower standard deviation of ES. 
In such situations, a negative relationship is expected between hedge funds’ liquidation 
likelihood and TRISK. It is also noteworthy that our variable does not measure the global 
amount of tail risk but variability from the expected tail risk (ES).  
INDRISK – To account for the impact macro-economic and industry specific conditions on 
funds’ liquidation likelihood, we use log odds of the past 24 months’ investment style 
specific liquidation rates (LRATE), computed as follows: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 | P a g e  
 
𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡1 − 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡� ,                                                             (7) 
𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−24𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−24 ,                       (8) 
This serves as a useful proxy for controlling the volatile macro-economic conditions during 
the sampling period. We expect INDRISK to be positively related to a fund’s liquidation risk. 
Since all main covariates discussed above require rolling estimation over the past 12, 
24 or 60 months, good numbers of missing values are generated in the variable generation 
process. To avoid losing observations, missing values of respective covariates are replaced 
with values computed using the available number of observations at time t. For instance, for 
missing values of WRSIZE, first we replace missing values with 11 months’ average, then 
with 10 months’ average, then with 9 months’ average, and so on. However, for rolling 
estimations involving a 60 months period, we consider a minimum of 24 months of available 
information to replace missing values.  
2.3.3 Control Variables 
To establish the robustness of our proposed covariates, we also report our multivariate 
results, supplementing the following control variables: 
AGE – Natural logarithm of a fund’s annual age. 
LUPD – Lock-up period dummy.  
RNP – Redemption Notice Period in months. 
OTP – Open to Public. This is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the fund is open 
for public subscription, and 0 otherwise. 
LVG – Leverage. This is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the fund uses leverage, 
and 0 otherwise. 
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HWM – High Water Mark. This is a dummy variable with the value 1 for high HWM 
provision, and 0 otherwise. 
PCAP – Personal Capital. This is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the fund 
manager has invested personal capital in the fund, and 0 otherwise. 
MFEE – management fees charged by the hedge fund manager in percent. 
IFEE – incentive fees charged by the hedge fund manager in percent. 
Investment Style – As discussed earlier, the eight investment styles that we consider are: 
equity market neutral, CA, event driven, fixed income arbitrage, dedicated short bias, 
long/short equity hedge, global macro, and multi-strategies. Thus we use seven investment 
style dummy variables (D1 – D7) to control for the investment style effect. We exclude funds 
which do not report their investment style. 
To gauge the discriminatory ability of respective control variables, first we run 
univariate regression for respective control variables. Only significant control variables are 
included in the multivariate models.  
3. Empirical Methods and Descriptive Analysis 
3.1 Logistic Regression 
The vast majority of recent empirical studies employ time-constant or time-varying 
versions of the Cox proportional hazard (CPH) model to estimate the failure hazard of hedge 
funds (e.g. Baba and Goko, 2009; Liang and Park, 2010). However, the CPH model is 
primarily designed to model continuous-time data, while hedge funds provide monthly 
information which leads to a discrete-time data structure. The continuous-time survival 
model is an appropriate choice when exact censoring and survival times are recorded in 
relatively fine units of time (such as seconds, hours or days) with no tied survival time 
periods (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). However, if the data shows relatively few 
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censoring or survival times with tied survival time periods, and the event of interest takes 
place at any time within the defined time interval, then the discrete-time survival model is 
more appropriate where coarse times-scales are generally used (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 
2012), for instance when expressing time to event in weeks, months, or years. Unlike in prior 
studies, which largely employ the Cox proportional hazard (CPH) model to estimate funds’ 
failure hazard, we believe that the discrete-time duration-dependent hazard (DPH) rate 
modeling technique is more appropriate in this context. However, in line with the findings of 
Gupta et al. (2017), we use panel logistic regression with random effects to establish our 
empirical validation. They argue that the discrete-time hazard model with logit link is 
essentially a panel logistic model that controls for firms’ age. Thus we assume that marginal 
probability of funds’ liquidation likelihood over the next time period follows a logistic 
distribution that is estimated as follows: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 1) = 11 + exp (−𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)                                                     (7) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund is liquidated in time t, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
is a vector of explanatory variables known at the end of the previous (or any appropriate 
lagged) time period. To capture any duration dependency, we use the natural logarithm of 
funds’ annual age (AGE) as a control variable in our multivariate models.  
3.2 Analysis of Survival and Hazard Curves 
Figure 1 presents a table of hazard and survival curves estimated using the Kaplan-
Meier2 estimator for our sample of hedge funds. H1 is the hazard curve of all funds and S1 is 
the survival curve for the same. As we see in H1, the risk of funds’ liquidation witnesses a 
gradual increase up to an age of about 70 months, followed by a gradual decline up to an age 
                                                 
2 See Kleinbaum and Klein (2012) for an understanding of the Kaplan-Meier estimator. 
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of about 250 months, after which, surprisingly, it rises steeply. However, our primary interest 
lies in hazard and survival curves of funds across the different size categories. H2 shows 
hazard curves of small, medium, and large funds, and S2 shows survival curves for the same. 
It is absolutely clear from H2 and S2 that the liquidation risk varies across different size 
categories. Small funds are the most vulnerable to liquidation, followed by medium and then 
large funds. As we see in H2, the hazard risk of large funds is the lowest and is mostly 
invariant with their age. In S2, we see that the likelihood of survival of large funds is highest 
at any given age and lowest for the small funds. Unlike large funds, the survival rate of small 
and medium funds varies significantly with age as well. About 25% of small funds liquidate 
by the time they are about 50 months old, and about 50% liquidate before they reach the age 
of 100 months. The hazard risk faced by medium funds is about half of that faced by small 
funds. Age invariant (mostly) hazard and survival curves of large funds signal that they enjoy 
clear advantages over small and medium funds due to their size, and can manage/mitigate 
liquidation risk much more efficiently than their smaller counterparts. Furthermore, the 
shapes of hazard curves of all funds and of small funds are quite similar. This might imply 
that small-sized funds dominate the sample, and thus the effect of medium and large funds is 
averaged out or marginalized. This may lead to heterogeneity within the sample and, 
subsequently, biased estimates. This gives us strong motivation to believe that the 
significance of factors affecting funds’ liquidation risk might vary across the size categories, 
and respective covariates may also show varying degrees of sensitivity across the different 
size categories.      
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[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
3.3 Summary Statistics and Correlation 
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are presented in Table 2. Column 1 
presents the list of covariates along with five measures of descriptive statistics: mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. Columns 2 and 3 report measures for 
all funds in our sample respectively for liquidated and censored (when no default has been 
observed) funds. Subsequent columns present similar information for small, medium, and 
large funds respectively.    
We expect the mean of covariates bearing a negative relationship with funds’ 
liquidation likelihood to be lower for the liquidated group of observations than for its 
censored counterpart, and vice versa. For instance, GROWTH is expected to have a negative 
relationship with liquidation likelihood, and a look at its mean across all size categories 
shows that its value is lower for the liquidated group of observations than for its censored 
counterpart. This is also true for TRISK, as its mean is significantly lower for liquidated 
groups of funds across all size categories and for the full sample. This reinforces our 
explanation on the negative relationship between TRISK and liquidation likelihood. Our 
expectation is well supported by all covariates across respective size categories except 
WRATIO. The mean of WRATIOs for liquidated groups of funds is higher than for their 
non-liquidated counterparts. In an ideal situation, mean of liquidated group of funds is 
expected to be lower. In subsequent regression analysis, this might lead to a positive 
relationship between WRATIO and liquidation likelihood. Broadly, median values of 
respective covariates reported in Table 2 are also sufficiently close to their respective mean 
values, thus problems that could emerge due to significant skewness are not expected. Also, 
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there is no unexpected variability in the values of standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum descriptive statistics for respective covariates across all size categories. 
A casual comparison of values of descriptive measures across the different size 
categories for respective covariates reveals reasonable differences in their values, particularly 
when comparison is made between small and large funds. We expect these differences to 
appear more prominently in our multivariate analysis. Furthermore, as reported in Table 3, 
there is no evidence of strong correlation among different covariates, thus multicollinearity is 
not expected to be an issue in the multivariate setup. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4. Regression Analysis for All Funds 
This section and the next report the univariate and multivariate regression results of this 
study. Unlike the vast majority of previous studies, we do not predict funds’ failure/exit 
probability over the next month or quarter. We believe that a failure prediction model should 
work as an early warning system, and the warning should give sufficient time to the decision 
maker/stakeholder to prepare for (or manage) the forthcoming crisis. It would be relatively 
easy for someone to predict cardiac arrest with very high likelihood after observing a person 
with severe chest pain. Thus we present our regression results for 6 months, 12 months and 
24 months lagged time periods to allow for sufficient time between the liquidation warning 
and the actual event. This also helps us to gauge the intertemporal predictive ability of our 
proposed covariates.  
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4.1 Univariate Regression Analysis 
4.1.1 Main Variables 
Table 4 reports univariate regression results for our entire sample of hedge funds. All 
seven main covariates are statistically significant across all lagged time periods. This shows 
strong intertemporal predictive ability of our proposed covariates. As expected WRSIZE, 
GROWTH, RETURN and TRISK are inversely related to liquidation likelihood across all 
lagged time periods except WRATIO. It is positively related to liquidation risk, which we 
expect to be negative. This confirms our earlier concern that funds might also choose to exit 
the database due to superior performance or persistent higher winning ratios, thus leading to a 
positive relationship between winning ratio and liquidation likelihood. This is further 
reinforced if one compares the mean of WRATIO for liquidated (0.55) and non-liquidated 
(0.52) groups of funds. In an ideal situation, the mean of a liquidated group of funds is 
expected to be lower than their non-liquidated counterparts, but it is otherwise. Negative 
coefficients of TRISK across all lagged periods and their strong statistical significance 
reinforce our explanation on negative relationship between TRISK and liquidation risk. The 
lower the value of d-ratio, the better the performance and thus the lower the liquidation 
likelihood. This is confirmed by the positive coefficient of DRATIO across all lagged 
periods. Finally, as expected, INDRISK shows a significant positive relationship with 
liquidation likelihood, and establishes the impact macro-economic and industry specific 
conditions on hedge funds’ liquidation likelihood. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.1.2 Control Variables 
The standard error of a multivariate regression model increases with an increase in the 
number of covariates, and this subsequently adds to the numerical instability of the model 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 | P a g e  
 
(Hosmer Jr et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017). This also makes the model more dependent on 
the observed data (Hosmer Jr et al., 2013). Thus, in order to keep the number of explanatory 
variables at a minimum and prevent insignificant control variables from entering the 
multivariate models, we perform univariate regression for all control variables discussed in 
Section 2.3.3. Our multivariate models exclude control variables that fail to be statistically 
significant at the 20% significance level in all three lagged time periods. Table 5 reports 
univariate regression results for control variables.  
OTP is significant at the 20% significance level for 6 months and 12 months lagged 
periods, and is significant at the 10% level for 24 months lagged periods. Thus we decide to 
include it in our multivariate models. Variables LVG, MFEE, and IFEE are highly 
insignificant in discriminating between liquidated and non-liquidated hedge funds across all 
three lagged time periods. The case of leverage is extremely interesting. While the amount of 
leverage is often cited as a dangerous and potentially destabilizing characteristic of the hedge 
fund industry, it is statistically insignificant in explaining hedge funds’ liquidation across all 
three lagged time periods.  Insignificance of LVG is consistent with the results of Liang and 
Park (2010), where they also report that the presence of leverage has no statistically 
significant impact on funds’ failure likelihood. Moreover, using the same database (TASS), 
Haghani (2014) reports that MFEE and IFEE are significant predictors of hedge funds’ 
failure. The results of Kim (2016a) are contrary to her results as they also report that 
management fees and incentive fees are insignificant predictors of hedge funds’ failure. 
Additionally, the seminal study by Liang and Park (2010) on hedge funds’ failure does not 
include MFEE and IFEE as control variables in their multivariate models. Thus, considering 
our univariate regression results and recent literature, we exclude LVG, MFEE and IFEE 
from our subsequent multivariate models. The control variables that we consider for further 
multivariate empirical analysis are AGE, LUPD, RNP, OTP, HWM, PCAP and Investment 
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Style. We do not report univariate regression results for Investment Style, as irrespective of 
their significance, we include all investment style specific dummies in our multivariate 
models. 
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[Insert Table 5 Here] 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
To assess the performance of proposed covariates in jointly predicting the probability 
of hedge funds’ liquidation, we estimate two sets of multivariate regression models. The first 
set employs only main covariates, and estimation is done for all three lagged time periods. 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 6 show our estimation results, and illustrate that all covariates 
are strongly significant in the multivariate setup across all three lagged time periods. 
Coefficients of respective covariates bear signs similar to those we report in our univariate 
results. DRATIO enters significantly with positive coefficient, while coefficients of TRISK 
are negative. This conforms to our earlier explanation of the direction of their relationship 
with liquidation likelihood. Further, the statistical significance of our proposed covariates 
across all three lagged time periods establishes their predictive power across the longer time 
horizon, and in turn provides sufficient early warning. 
The second set of regressions models are obtained by supplementing the first set with 
the control variables discussed in Section 2.3.3 and the findings in Section 4.1.2. This helps 
us to control for observable differences in individual hedge fund characteristics, and establish 
the stability and predictive power of proposed covariates after controlling for various fund 
characteristics. Columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 6 present the results. As we see, all proposed 
covariates are strongly significant, even after introducing control variables into the 
multivariate setup with expected sign of respective coefficients. 
Most of the control variables are statistically significant in predicting hedge funds’ 
liquidation. AGE is statistically significant for all lagged estimations with negative 
coefficients. This implies that matured funds are less likely to enter liquidation. The fact that 
a fund has a lock-up period decreases its probability of default, thus LUPD is negative and 
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statistically significant at the 1% level for the 6 months and 12 months lagged periods, and at 
the 5% level for 24 months. It is therefore in line with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), 
who argue that when a fund has a lock-up period, it has more funding for liquidity, and thus it 
can recover from short term liquidity shocks, thereby increasing its chances of survival by 
lowering the risk of a “liquidity spiral” (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Although RNP is 
negative, it turns insignificant for all lagged estimates. OTP is negative and weakly 
significant at the 10% level only for 6 months lagged estimates and at the 15% level for 12 
and 24 months lagged estimates. Thus, open-ended funds have a marginally higher likelihood 
of survival than closed-ended funds. We can explain this phenomenon by the fact that open 
funds can get new inflows, while closed funds are restricted in their base capital, which 
increases the probability of investors running to the exit. On the other hand, a penalty on exit 
in the form of a high-water mark (HWM) is negatively correlated with funds’ failure 
likelihood, and is statistically significant across all lagged periods. Finally, when a manager 
invests his/her own capital in a fund (and hence have “skin in the game”), the fund’s default 
likelihood is reduced. This is weakly confirmed by the fact that PCAP is negative and 
statistically significant at the 15% level for 6 months, at the 10% level for 12 months, and 
insignificant for the 24 months lagged periods. Also, casual comparison of the magnitude of 
respective covariates’ coefficients across both groups shows minor or very little variation. 
Thus predictive power of our proposed covariates is unaffected by the introduction of control 
variables. This in turn implies that our proposed covariates and the information content in 
control variables complement each other. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
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5. Regression Analysis by Size Categories 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
We perform univariate regression analysis of main covariates to verify their power to 
explain liquidation likelihood of small, medium, and large funds respectively. In particular 
we verify whether statistical significance of our main covariates vary across size categories or 
not. Table 7 presents univariate regression results across different sized categories of hedge 
funds. Regression results for small, medium and large funds, and for all funds, are presented 
for all three lagged time periods.  
As reported in Table 7, all main covariates are highly significant in explaining 
liquidation likelihood of small funds for 6, 12 and 24 months lagged periods except 
RETURN (see columns 2, 6 and 10 in Table 7). It loses its significance beyond 12 months. 
These covariates also exhibit significant discriminatory power for 6 and 12 months’ 
univariate regression estimates of medium sized funds, however GROWTH, RETURN and 
TRISK turns insignificant for 24 months lagged estimates (see columns 3, 7 and 11 in Table 
7). Finally, the case of large funds is most interesting. All main covariates except WRATIO 
and DRATIO fail miserably in discriminating between liquidated and censored large funds 
across all lagged periods (see columns 4, 8 and 12 in Table 7). This reinforces our hypothesis 
and calls for an alternative mechanism to estimate liquidity risk of large funds. Comparison 
of coefficients of all funds and small/medium funds reveal observable differences in their 
magnitudes (and occasionally significance) across all three lagged time periods. 
Interestingly, although significant, the coefficients of WRSIZE for small and medium 
funds experience a sign change across all lagged estimates. This implies that small/medium 
funds have a higher probability of default when they are bigger, which is contrary to the 
whole sample, implying that the likelihood of funds’ liquidation is positively related to its 
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size within a given size category, but negatively related to size in the absence of any size 
category. It indicates that size is not related to hedge fund failure in a linear fashion. Within a 
size class, size is a positive factor, whereas for the whole sample, belonging to a bigger size 
class reduces funds’ probability of failure. This may imply that the significance of covariates 
for our sample of all funds might be driven by small and medium sized funds, and a detailed 
inspection must be undertaken to understand and identify the factors that threaten the survival 
of large funds. 
Overall, all main covariates are highly significant in explaining liquidation likelihood 
of small and medium sized funds for up to one year, but are broadly insignificant in 
explaining liquidation of large funds. This can come from the fact that large hedge funds 
exhibit only a few defaults, and that these defaults are structurally different from the 
relatively numerous ones of small and medium hedge funds. Part of the inability of 
GROWTH can be explained by the already important size of big hedge funds: a big fund 
experiencing outflows still has large assets under management, decreasing its impact on the 
probability of failure. Statistical estimates that are unable to account for these size differences 
might results into biased estimates, with statistical significance of covariates/models being 
primarily driven by small and medium sized funds.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
In order to deepen our understanding of the differences observed in Section 5.1, we 
present here results obtained from multivariate regression analysis for our sample of hedge 
funds across different size categories and lagged time periods. Table 8 presents multivariate 
regression models obtained by employing only our proposed covariates. Further, to test the 
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robustness of our proposed covariates, Table 9 presents multivariate regression results 
obtained using main and control variables. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.2.1 Small Funds 
As reported in Table 8 (columns 2, 6 and 10), for small funds, WRSIZE is significant 
across all lagged periods but the sign of its coefficient changes from negative (for all funds) 
to positive. Remaining covariates also exhibit significant discriminatory power across all 
lagged periods except GROWTH for 12 months lagged estimate. Thus, except the sign of 
WRSIZE, regression estimates for small funds are broadly in line with regression estimates 
obtained for the sample of all funds. However, there are noticeable differences in the 
magnitude of their respective coefficients when compared with coefficients of all funds. 
Globally, the results are similar to those obtained in the univariate section. 
Next, we supplement the models estimated in Table 8 with control variables (see 
columns 2, 6 and 10 in Table 9). Statistical significance and sign of respective coefficients 
remains the same as the multivariate models estimated without control variables. This 
establishes the complementary information content of our main covariates. 
5.2.2 Medium Funds 
As reported in Table 8 (columns 3, 7 and 11), medium funds’ regression estimates for 
the 6 months lagged period is almost similar to estimates of small funds. However, we see 
some difference in the 12 and 24 months lagged estimates. GROWTH is insignificant for 12 
and 24 months lagged estimates, while WRATIO is insignificant only for the 24 months 
lagged estimate.  
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After introducing control variables, when we look at the results for medium funds, we 
see a different pattern compared to those for small funds with control variables. For the 6 
months lagged estimations, all main variables are significant except WRSIZE. When we 
consider 12 months lagged estimates, GROWTH and RETURN (weakly significant) becomes 
insignificant. For the lagged period of 24 months, WRSIZE (weakly significant), GROWTH 
and RETURN are insignificant.  
5.2.3 Large Funds 
Finally, as reported in Tables 8 and 9, for large funds, empirical results are completely 
different compared to small and medium funds. For the 6 and 12 months lagged period, only 
WRATIO, DRATIO and TRISK are statistically significant. While for the 24 months lagged 
estimates, only WRATIO and DRATIO are significant.  These results remain the same even 
in the presence of control variables. This indicates that large hedge funds have a different risk 
profile to small and medium funds, and it is inappropriate to explain their liquidation with 
traditional variables.  This feature is interesting because it clearly shows that variables 
predicting hedge funds’ liquidation do not affect funds equally across the different size 
categories. 
An explanation of this fact can be that big hedge funds are structurally different from 
smaller ones. It might be that big hedge funds need to shrink before failing, so they change 
size category before failing. For example, a big hedge fund having continuously low returns 
can see its assets under management shrink but will not fail until it reaches the medium size 
category and effectively fail.  
6. Interaction between Fund Size and Investment Style 
Adding interaction between fund size and investment style to multivariate regression 
models reported in Table 6 would allow us to test the hypothesis that the impact of fund size 
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on liquidation likelihood of hedge funds varies with investment style. Table 10 shows 
multivariate regression models with interaction terms for fund size and investment style. 
Results are presented without and with control variables and for the three lagged periods. 
Size category “Small Funds” and investment style “Convertible Arbitrage” are considered 
reference groups, and thus main and interaction effects are reported for medium funds, large 
funds and remaining investment styles. 
First and foremost, when interactions between fund size and investment style are taken 
into account, the variable WRSIZE becomes positive, but remains statistically significant. 
This means that, once the fact that a fund belongs to a particular size group and investment 
style is accounted for, the bigger the fund the more likely it is to enter liquidation. This result 
can seem counterintuitive at first sight, but this can reflect the fact that within a particular 
category, bigger hedge funds are more exposed to specific risks. Edelman et al. (2013) show 
that the distribution of size is not uniformly distributed across the hedge fund industry. This 
may imply that a particular hedge fund being bigger relative to a particular size category is a 
risk, because it may induce bets to attract future inflows and change its size category. This 
effect of size on the risk of failure increases with the lagged time period in the observation of 
variables, and is robust to the inclusion of control variables. Variables RETURN, TRISK and 
GROWTH have negative and statistically significant impact on the probability of future 
hedge fund failure for all three lagged periods, without and with control variables. However, 
GROWTH is weakly significant for 12 and 24 months lagged estimates in the presence of 
interaction effects. Funds having higher WRATIO, DRATIO and INDRISK variables exhibit 
a higher probability of liquidation. This result is robust to the length of the lags and to the 
inclusion of control variables. A higher INDRISK means a greater macroeconomic or 
industry risk and thus a higher likelihood of liquidation. DRATIO measures the relative size 
of negative returns compared with positive ones. Therefore, a higher DRATIO implies a 
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greater imbalance towards negative returns and hence is positively associated with future 
hedge fund failure. Broadly, statistical significance of all main variables is in line with the 
global patterns observed in previous univariate and multivariate regressions. 
The main effect of medium sized funds (MF) is insignificant throughout, but the main 
effect of large funds (LF) is highly significant across all estimates. This reaffirms our earlier 
results and clearly supports our hypothesis that liquidation likelihood of hedge funds varies 
with size categories. The main effects of investment styles are mostly insignificant for all 
estimates, but are weakly significant for ‘Equity Market Neutral’ and ‘Global Macro’ for 
estimates without control variables. However, investment style bears some statistical 
relevance when interaction is considered between them and fund size. For interaction effects 
between fund size and investment styles, broadly we observe a significant relationship 
between the medium size category and investment styles for 6 and 12 months lagged 
estimates. However, ‘MF×Dedicated Short Bias’ and ‘MF×Fixed Income Arbitrage’ are 
insignificant throughout. No interaction terms are significant for 24 months lagged estimates. 
Concerning interaction terms between large funds and investment styles, the only statistically 
significant term is ‘LF×Dedicated Short Bias’, which is positive across all estimates. This 
implies that among big funds, following a dedicated short bias strategy will lead to a higher 
liquidation likelihood. 
Broadly, the impact of fund size on liquidation likelihood of hedge funds varies with 
investment style and it might be appropriate to consider this while predicting hedge funds’ 
liquidation. Other than sign reversal of WRSIZE and weak significance of GROWTH beyond 
6 months lagged estimates, the rest of the proposed covariates are highly significant even in 
the presence of interaction terms. The weak significance of GROWTH might be due to the 
presence of a large number of insignificant control and interaction terms in the model. Also, 
comparisons of multivariate regression models in Table 6 with models in Table 10 reveal no 
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drastic changes in respective coefficients of main covariates except WRSIZE. This shows the 
robustness and consistency of our proposed covariates.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
7. Conclusion 
Liquidation of hedge funds can impose considerable costs to both the fund manager and 
its investors (Lan et al., 2013). Furthermore, failures of very large funds can impose threats 
on the stability of the financial system as a whole, as seen with the spectacular failure of 
LTCM, and therefore understanding the causes of such failures is important for managers, 
investors, and related stakeholders such as prime brokers (who lend securities and money to 
hedge funds) and regulators. There is a sufficient volume of literature that explores factors 
affecting hedge funds failure, and different forms of fund failure. However, we contribute to 
the existing body of literature by acknowledging the differences in liquidation likelihood that 
might appear due to funds’ size. We also propose several new covariates that explain hedge 
funds’ liquidation. In particular we explore information content of funds’ relative size 
(WRSIZE), growth in assets under management (GROWTH), total value of downside and 
upside returns (DRATIO), volatility of tail risk (TRISK), and past liquidation rate of hedge 
funds (INDRISK) in predicting liquidation likelihood of hedge funds. We also investigate the 
discriminatory power of funds’ own performance (RETURN) and their past 60 months 
winning ratio (WRATIO) in predicting hedge funds liquidation. 
Our empirical analysis, performed using a sample of hedge funds from the Lipper 
(TASS) database, shows compelling evidence that the liquidation likelihood is inversely 
related to fund size, and factors affecting hedge funds’ liquidation vary in terms of their 
statistical significance across different size categories. While broad set of covariates explain 
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failure of small and medium funds (WRSIZE, GROWTH, RETURN, WRATIO, DRATIO, 
TRISK and INDRISK), only two variables (WRATO and DRATIO) are show significant 
explanatory power in explaining liquidation of large. Magnitudes of respective regression 
coefficients for small and medium funds are also marginally higher compared to estimates 
obtained for all funds, suggesting that small and medium-sized funds are marginally more 
vulnerable to changes in factors or fund characteristics. The insignificance of our proposed 
covariates in explaining liquidation of large funds and their significance in explaining 
liquidation of small and medium funds might imply that small and medium sized funds have 
dominant influence on regression estimates, and estimates obtained by employing the entire 
sample of hedge funds might be biased. This is further supported when we include main 
effects and interaction effects of fund size and investment style into our regression model for 
all funds. Our results support the view that fund managers can choose to let the fund grow 
large even if it hurts the performance in order to limit their failure risk. Thus, an appropriate 
modelling approach of hedge funds’ liquidation needs to account for the size of funds 
considered. 
Our findings shall be of particular interest to safety-first investors, who may prefer to 
deal with large hedge funds to avoid losses that may arise due to the higher risk of liquidation 
faced by smaller funds. Hedge funds are often blamed for contributing towards increasingly 
systematic risk and financial instability, and in this context it is worth exploring if a particular 
size category of funds is primarily responsible for this. Exploring how other forms of fund 
exits vary across size categories may also be a worthy extension. 
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Figure 1: Table of Hazard and Survival Curves 
  
  
Notes: This table presents hazard and survival curves of hedge funds estimated using the Kaplan-Meier 
Estimator (see, Kleinbaum and Klein, 2012). H1 is the hazard curve of all funds and S1 is the corresponding 
survival curve for the same. H2 presents hazard curves for small, medium and large funds, while S2 presents 
their survival curves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Liquidation Rate of Hedge Funds 
Year All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds 
Liquidated Total %Liquidated Liquidated Total %Liquidated Liquidated Total %Liquidated Liquidated Total %Liquidated 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
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1995 0 69 0.0000 0 32 0.0000 0 35 0.0000 0 9 0.0000 
1996 4 166 2.4096 3 79 3.7975 1 86 1.1628 0 17 0.0000 
1997 4 290 1.3793 3 132 2.2728 1 164 0.6097 0 36 0.0000 
1998 21 443 4.7404 14 205 6.8293 5 237 2.1097 2 63 3.1746 
1999 22 539 4.0816 20 233 8.5837 2 321 0.6230 0 79 0.0000 
2000 29 587 4.9404 21 225 9.3333 6 358 1.6760 2 122 1.6393 
2001 16 913 1.7525 10 278 3.5971 6 557 1.0772 0 208 0.0000 
2002 36 1081 3.3302 19 355 5.3521 16 665 2.4060 1 234 0.4273 
2003 51 1209 4.2184 28 402 6.9652 22 737 2.9851 1 295 0.3390 
2004 62 1365 4.5421 40 413 9.6852 21 769 2.7308 1 372 0.2688 
2005 82 1547 5.3006 40 462 5.6580 39 869 4.4879 3 447 0.6711 
2006 52 1536 3.3854 34 423 8.0378 17 842 2.0190 1 484 0.2066 
2007 45 1529 2.9431 23 377 6.1008 18 818 2.2005 4 555 0.7207 
2008 103 1485 6.9360 49 454 10.7929 47 859 5.4715 7 500 1.4000 
2009 72 1325 5.4340 44 452 9.7345 23 781 2.9449 5 340 1.4706 
2010 77 1341 5.7420 43 411 10.4623 32 762 4.1995 2 330 0.6061 
2011 79 1175 6.7234 35 351 9.9715 39 677 5.7607 5 303 1.6502 
2012 76 1009 7.5322 39 296 13.1757 32 571 5.6042 5 275 1.8182 
2013 20 856 2.3365 9 210 4.2857 10 480 2.0833 1 262 0.3817 
2014 46 755 6.0927 20 182 10.9890 17 404 4.2079 9 244 3.6885 
2015 41 627 6.5391 19 160 11.8750 18 327 5.5046 4 204 1.9608 
2016 18 517 3.4816 11 134 8.2089 3 262 1.1450 4 185 2.1622 
Average   4.2655   7.5321   2.7731   1.0266 
Notes: This table presents yearly details of liquidated and censored hedge funds. Column 1 lists years followed 
by number of funds liquidated in that year (column 2), total number of funds in the database in that year 
(column 3), and percentage of funds liquidated (Liquidated/Total×100) in that year (column 4) for our entire 
sample of hedge funds. Subsequent columns show similar information for small, medium, and large sized funds. 
In the last row, ‘Average’ is mean of annual liquidation rates reported in columns 4, 7, 10 and 13 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Variable All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds 
Liquidated Censored Liquidated Censored Liquidated Censored Liquidated Censored 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
WRSIZE         
Mean -7.7149 -6.6571 -8.8031 -8.9000 -6.6722 -6.6475 -4.5698 -4.5545 
Median -7.8013 -6.6603 -8.8990 -8.9294 -6.9300 -6.7889 -4.8671 -4.6971 
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SD 2.0010 2.0804 1.6930 1.6755 1.3038 1.3448 1.3150 1.2371 
Minimum -15.7514 -24.4254 -15.7514 -24.4245 -9.6197 -12.4805 -7.2946 -13.174 
Maximum -1.3552 0.0000 -2.2418 -0.0002 -1.3552 -0.0104 -1.3586 0.0000 
         
GROWTH         
Mean -0.0522 0.0036 -0.0701 -0.1324 -0.0336 0.0060 -0.0106 0.0073 
Median -0.0241 0.0041 -0.0346 -0.0002 -0.0195 0.0036 -0.0001 0.0109 
SD 0.1044 0.0745 0.1235 0.1050 0.0712 0.6419 0.0493 0.0526 
Minimum -0.9723 -4.5291 -0.9723 -4.5290 -0.3941 -3.0555 -0.1399 -1.3812 
Maximum 0.4405 3.1741 0.2986 3.1741 0.4405 1.3817 0.0946 1.5216 
         
RETURN         
Mean -0.0450 0.0053 -0.0059 0.0024 -0.0026 0.0057 -0.0034 0.0073 
Median -0.0007 0.0057 -0.0012 0.0037 -0.0001 0.0057 0.0046 0.0070 
SD 0.0258 0.0208 0.0296 0.0268 0.0190 0.0196 0.0268 0.0155 
Minimum -0.2698 -1.1439 -0.2698 -1.1439 -0.1238 -0.1238 -0.1210 -0.1971 
Maximum 0.2754 0.4230 0.2754 0.3861 0.0641 0.0641 0.0308 0.2897 
         
WRATIO         
Mean 0.5469 0.5200 0.5266 0.4857 0.5683 0.5127 0.5939 0.5666 
Median 0.5500 0.5500 0.5294 0.5000 0.5667 0.5500 0.6052 0.6000 
SD 1.3193 0.2260 1.2822 0.2177 0.1277 0.2254 0.1586 0.2273 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0667 0.0000 0.0667 0.0000 
Maximum 0.9661 1.0000 0.9661 1.0000 0.9592 1.0000 0.9355 1.0000 
         
DRATIO         
Mean -0.3211 -1.2199 -0.1108 -0.759 -0.4746 -1.2114 -1.2442 -1.6726 
Median -0.2355 -1.0213 -0.0569 -0.6327 -0.3883 -1.0235 -1.2643 -1.3989 
SD 1.4478 1.4849 1.4049 1.3731 1.3887 1.4261 1.7298 1.5611 
Minimum -9.2522 -11.5364 -9.2522 -10.0747 -6.9077 -10.6139 -7.6145 -11.5364 
Maximum 7.4838 7.4838 7.4838 7.4838 4.068 6.9591 2.2623 5.2307 
         
TRISK         
Mean 0.0081 0.1138 0.0079 0.1121 0.0084 0.1150 0.0074 0.1130 
Median 0.0012 0.0038 0.0004 0.0030 0.0018 0.0038 0.0023 0.0044 
SD 0.0189 0.0215 0.0206 0.0236 0.0172 0.0222 0.0114 0.0179 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.3024 0.4155 0.3025 0.4155 0.1413 0.4145 0.05343 0.3063 
         
INDRISK         
Mean -2.2424 -2.8778 -2.2586 -2.9561 -2.2166 -2.8804 -2.2629 -2.7986 
Median -2.1907 -2.4805 -2.2311 -2.5427 -2.1517 -2.4737 -2.2676 -2.4474 
SD 0.5884 1.3019 0.5971 1.3598 0.5724 1.3184 0.6159 1.2052 
Minimum -5.1705 -6.9067 -5.1705 -6.9067 -4.5326 -6.9067 -4.5493 -6.9067 
Maximum 0.1823 0.1823 0.1283 -0.1823 -0.5596 0.1823 -0.5596 -0.5947 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of respective covariates for our entire sample of hedge funds, 
followed by measures across respective size categories. Funds corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of 
assets under management (AUM) are considered as small funds, those in the top 25 percentile as large funds, 
and the rest medium funds. Funds are separated between liquidated and censored (for which the liquidation fate 
has not yet occurred) groups and descriptive measures are reported for both groups separately. If a fund fails in 
month t, the fund’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and ‘0’ in other months. Column 1 lists main 
covariates along with names of descriptive measures that we report in subsequent columns. Columns 2 and 3 
report descriptive measures for liquidated and non-liquidated groups respectively, while subsequent columns 
present similar information for respective size categories. WRSIZE is the weighted average of a fund’s relative 
size; GROWTH is the percentage change in its assets under management; RETURN is the geometric mean of 
past 12 months’ rate of return; WRATIO is winning ratio over the past 60 months; DRATIO is natural 
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logarithm of the past 60 months d-ratio, which measures the ratio of the total value of downside returns over the 
total value of upside returns; TRISK is the volatility of tail risk; and INDRISK is the natural logarithm of the 
past 24 months’ liquidation rates. See Section 2.3.2 for details.    
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Main Variables 
 WRSIZE GROWTH RETURN WRATIO DRATIO TRISK INDRISK 
WRSIZE 1.0000       
GROWTH 0.0448 1.0000      
RETURN 0.0490 0.3209 1.0000     
WRATIO 0.1147 0.0003 0.1148 1.0000    
DRATIO -0.2580 -0.2006 -0.2392 -0.2249 1.0000   
TRISK -0.0271 -0.0428 -0.0305 0.0826 0.0934 1.0000  
INDRISK -0.0444 -0.1137 -0.0730 0.1071 0.1363 0.1613 1.0000 
Notes: This table presents correlation among main covariates estimated over the sample period 1995-2016.    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Univariate Regression for All Funds: Main Variables 
Variable Lag Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
WRSIZE    
β -0.1942a -0.2001a -0.1637a 
SE 0.0159 0.0174 0.0210 
R2 0.0455 0.0426 0.0272 
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GROWTH    
β -2.769a -2.7739a -2.7555a 
SE 0.2810 0.3570 0.4414 
R2 0.0105 0.0086 0.0074 
RETURN    
β -10.5663a -7.6738a -6.3624a 
SE 1.1021 1.2605 1.7965 
R2 0.0127 0.0059 0.0037 
WRATIO    
β 1.0918a 1.6679a 2.2819a 
SE 0.1507 0.1598 0.1887 
R2 0.0177 0.0369 0.0641 
DRATIO    
β 0.5643a 0.6761a 0.7589a 
SE 0.0253 0.0328 0.04758 
R2 0.1703 0.2060 0.2153 
TRISK    
β -14.7845a -14.5488a -5.4045b 
SE 2.6175 2.9049 2.7693 
R2 0 .0298 0.0263 0.0033 
INDRISK    
β 0.2115a 0.0604b 0.1263a 
SE 0.0353 0.0311 0.0404 
R2 0.0193 0.0015 0.0061 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents univariate panel 
logistic regression results of main covariates estimated over a sampling period of 1995-2016. Regression 
estimates are reported for 6 months (column 1), 12 months (column 2), and 24 months (column 3) lagged time 
periods. If a fund fails in month t, the fund’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive 
(negative) coefficient (β) suggests that the variable increases (decreases) the probability of funds’ liquidation, 
SE is standard error of respective coefficients and R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina's R2. WRSIZE is the weighted 
average of a fund’s relative size; GROWTH is the percentage change in its assets under management; RETURN 
is the geometric mean of past 12 months rate of return; WRATIO is winning ratio over the past 60 months; 
DRATIO is natural logarithm of the past 60 months d-ratio, which measures the ratio of the total value of 
downside returns over the total value of upside returns; TRISK is the volatility of tail risk; and INDRISK is the 
natural logarithm of the past 24 months’ liquidation rates. See Section 2.3.2 for details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Univariate Regression for All Funds: Control Variables 
Variable Lag Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AGE    
β -0.1455a -0.2834a -0.3325a 
SE 0.0381 0.0375 0.0435 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 | P a g e  
 
R2 0.0044 0.0166 0.0222 
LUPD    
β -0.4125a -0.4465a -0.4589a 
SE 0.0771 0.0864 0.1022 
R2 0.0111 0.0113 0.0116 
RNP    
β -0.2878a -0.3154a -0.3219a 
SE 0.0431 0.0480 0.0579 
R2 0.0221 0.0231 0.0231 
OTP    
β -0.1453d -0.1580d -0.2327c 
SE 0.094 0.1067 0.1267 
R2 8.9e-04 9.2e-04 0.0020 
HWM    
β -0.3405a -0.3876a -0.4131a 
SE 0.075 0.0855 0.1023 
R2 0.0061 0.0068 0.0074 
PCAP    
β -0.2361a -0.2617a -0.2088b 
SE 0.0726 0.0819 0.0963 
R2 0.0038 0.0041 0.0025 
LVG    
β -0.1510 -0.0390 -0.0709 
SE 0.0729 0.0823 0.0978 
R2 1.5e-05 8.4e-05 2.6e-04 
MFEE    
                   β 0.0185 0.0197 -0.0084 
                         SE 0.0703 0.0793 0.096 
R2 2.3e-05 2.2e-05 3.8e-06 
IFEE    
                   β -0.0052 -0.0097 -0.0005 
                       SE 0.0072 0.008 0.0102 
R2 1.7e-04 4.8e-04 1.4e-06 
Notes: a (b) [c] {d} significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] {20%} level (two-sided test). This table presents 
univariate panel logistic regression results of control variables estimated over a sampling period of 1995-2016. 
Regression estimates are reported for 6 months (column 1), 12 months (column 2), and 24 months (column 3) 
lagged time periods. If a fund fails in month t, the fund’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and ‘0’ 
otherwise. A positive (negative) coefficient (β) suggests that the variable increases (decreases) the probability of 
funds’ liquidation, SE is standard error of respective coefficients and R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina's R2. AGE is 
natural logarithm of a fund’s annual age; LUPD is Lock-up period dummy; RNP is Redemption Notice Period 
in months; OTP is Open to Public dummy which takes the value 1 if the fund is open for public subscription and 
0 otherwise; LVG is Leverage dummy which takes the value 1 if the fund uses leverage and 0 otherwise; HWM 
is High Water Mark dummy variable with the value 1 for high HWM provision, and 0 otherwise; PCAP is 
Personal Capital dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the fund manager has invested personal capital in 
the fund, and 0 otherwise; MFEE is management fees charged by the hedge fund manager in percent; and IFEE 
is incentive fees charged by the hedge fund manager in percent. 
 
Table 6: Multivariate Regression Model for All Funds 
Variable Without Control Variables  With Control Variables 
Lag Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months  6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
WRSIZE        
β -0.1403a -0.1259a -0.0998a  -0.1885a -0.1632a -0.1106a 
SE 0.0161 0.0163 0.0208  0.0180 0.0186 0.0225 
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GROWTH        
β -1.6438a -1.7825a -1.7257a  -1.5921a -1.6886a -1.8948a 
SE 0.2700 0.3813 0.4958  0.2607 0.3730 0.4365 
RETURN        
β -7.6823a -4.9115a -4.9075a  -7.5856a -5.0110a -4.7534a 
SE 1.3138 1.4041 1.9572  1.3039 1.3903 1.8879 
WRATIO        
β 2.9794a 3.0641a 3.4488a  2.9564a 3.0570a 3.3999a 
SE 0.2025 0.1862 0.2201  0.2038 0.1876 0.2052 
DRATIO        
β 0.6203a 0.7028a 0.8154a  0.5886a 0.6662a 0.7269a 
SE 0.0296 0.0320 0.0471  0.0302 0.0329 0.0435 
TRISK        
β -25.5912a -26.0936a -23.4122a  -20.6695a -19.8760a -15.1501a 
SE 2.8150 2.9178 3.2367  2.7966 2.8493 2.9192 
INDRISK        
β 0.2579a 0.0944a 0.0972a  0.2927a 0.1540a 0.2073a 
SE 0.0333 0.0285 0.2047  0.0363 0.0318 0.0390 
AGE        
β     -0.1021b -0.1707a -0.4105a 
SE     0.0482 0.0470 0.0541 
LUPD        
β     -0.2394a -0.2330a -0.2107b 
SE     0.0789 0.0807 0.0942 
RNP        
β     -0.0546 -0.0531 -0.0382 
SE     0.0429 0.0439 0.0507 
OTP        
β     -0.1705c -0.1407 -0.1689 
SE     0.0924 0.0940 0.1100 
HWM        
β     -0.2507a -0.2437a -0.2533a 
SE     0.7546 0.0772 0.0904 
PCAP        
β     -0.1118c -0.1287c -0.9071 
SE     0.0712 0.0727 0.0835 
Investment Style     Yes Yes Yes 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2 830.9300a 893.0900a 568.0300a  928.2600a 987.8700a 790.4400a 
Log Likelihood -5,334.2057 -4,999.9527 -3,705.6916  -5,277.6453 -4942.7056 -3,639.2845 
R2 0.3367 0.3375 0.3570  0.3380 0.3389 0.3586 
No. of “0” 176,035 154,854 119,436  175,814 154,673 119,316 
No. of “1” 928 889 655  927 888 654 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents multivariate panel 
logistic regression results for 6 months, 12 months, and 24 months lagged periods, estimated over a sampling 
period of 1995-2016. Columns 2, 3 and 4 do not include control variables and the rest include control variables 
in the multivariate estimates. If a fund liquidates in month t, the fund’s binary indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and 
‘0’ otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with liquidation likelihood and vice-
versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina's R2. No. of “1” counts the 
number of failures in our sample, while No. of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations.     
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Table 7: Univariate Regression Analysis by Size Categories 
Lag Months 6 Months Lag 12 Months Lag 24 Months Lag 
Variable All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
WRSIZE             
β -0.1942a 0.1039a 0.0799b 0.08879 -2.0010a 0.0727b 0.1181a 0.0091 -0.1637a 0.1085a 0.1198a 0.0320 
SE -6.6407 0.0272 0.0361 0.1010 0.0175 0.0302 0.038 0.0998 0.0210 0.0361 0.0424 0.1116 
R2 0.0455 0.0123 0.0082 0.0102 0.0426 0.0050 0.0151 1.1e-04 0.0272 0.0101 0.0137 0.0013 
GROWTH             
β -2.7695a -1.4446a -3.1186a -2.0885 -2.7739a -1.1404b -1.8324a -1.6243 -2.7555a -2.2198a -0.997 -0.0608 
SE 0.2811 0.3110 0.6244 2.6495 0.3570 0.4913 0.5761 2.5503 0.4414 0.6294 0.8221 2.7702 
R2 0.0105 0.0028 0.0138 0.0066 0.0086 0.0013 0.0039 0.0037 0.0074 0.0041 09.7e-04 4.8e-06 
RETURN             
β -10.5663a -5.4966a -11.8323a -9.8612 -7.6738a -2.9036b -7.1146a -8.9467 -6.3624a -2.7930 -2.7247 -14.8823c 
SE 1.1021 1.4415 1.9158 8.1605 1.2605 1.6641 2.6015 8.3095 1.7965 2.2985 3.1129 7.7605 
R2 0.0127 0.0032 0.0167 0.0117 0.0059 7.4e-04 0.0053 0.0097 0.0037 6.0e-04 06.7e-04 0.0256 
WRATIO             
β 1.0918a 1.4077a 1.6691a 1.2299b 1.6679a 1.9752a 2.1731a 1.4613b 2.2819a 2.7094a 2.5850a 1.0236 
SE 0.1507 0.2215 0.2419 0.6106 0.1598 0.2425 0.2545 0.6161 0.1887 0.2966 0.2859 0.6769 
R2 0.0177 0.0282 0.0425 0.0241 0.0369 0.0487 0.0639 0.0312 0.0641 0.0857 0.0813 0.0184 
DRATIO             
β 0.5643a 0.4341a 0.4989a 0.3377a 0.6761a 0.5056a 0.5589a 0.5535a 0.7589a 0.5293a 0.6060a 0.5495a 
SE 0.0253 0.0403 0.0451 0.1109 0.0328 0.0512 0.0528 0.1269 0.0476 0.0771 0.0720 0.1661 
R2 0.1703 0.1007 0.1367 0.0685 0.2060 0.1082 0.1498 0.1596 0.2153 0.0980 0.1451 0.1522 
TRSIK             
β -14.7545a -11.8904a -13.705a -19.2209 -14.5488a -12.5164a -13.9339a -20.3966 -5.4045c -8.8157b -5.2944 -6.0659 
SE 2.6175 3.4572 4.0688 12.1855 2.9049 3.7617 4.3412 12.6351 2.7693 4.0785 4.0575 11.7049 
R2 0.0298 0.0182 0.0257 0.0493 0.0263 0.0171 0.0261 0.0557 0.0033 0.0075 0.0031 0.0051 
INDRISK             
β 0.2116a 0.3382a 0.2024a 0.05457 0.0605c 0.1124b 0.1217b -0.1164 0.1263a 0.1161b 0.1826a 0.1174 
SE 0.0353 0.5590 0.0532 0.1128 0.0311 0.0468 0.0507 0.0880 0.0404 0.0569 0.0630 0.1371 
R2 0.0193 0.0416 0.0186 0.0016 0.0015 0.0045 0.0063 0.0074 0.0061 0.0045 0.0120 0.0077 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents univariate panel logistic regression results of respective covariates for 6 months 
(columns 1 to 4), 12 months (columns 5 to 8), and 24 months (columns 9 to 12) lagged time periods across different size categories. The sampling period is between 1995-
2016. We consider funds corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of AUM as small funds, those in the top 25 percentile as large funds, and the rest medium funds. If a fund 
liquidates in month t, the fund’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with liquidation likelihood 
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and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina's R2. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in our sample, while No. of “0” 
counts the number of “non-failure” observations.     
 
 
Table 8: Multivariate Regression Models without Control Variables by Size Categories 
Lag Months 6 Months Lag 12 Months Lag 24 Months Lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variable All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds 
WRSIZE             
β -0.1403a 0.0930a 0.0990a 0.1305 -0.1259a 0.0770a 0.1303a 0.0468 -0.0998a 0.1064a 0.1169a 0.0632 
SE 0.0161 0.0258 0.0374 0.1070 0.0163 0.0261 0.0365 0.1018 0.0208 0.0339 0.0415 0.1194 
GROWTH             
β -1.6438a -0.7951a -2.2350a 0.7964 -1.7825a -0.6522 -0.6140 1.0250 -1.7257a -1.6437a 0.7839 2.7710 
SE 0.2700 0.3227 0.5685 2.7301 0.3813 0.4948 0.9839 2.5428 0.4958 0.6380 1.1442 2.0622 
RETURN             
β -7.6823a -5.7913a -9.7537a -6.6804 -4.9115a -4.3523a -5.7245a -5.5494 -4.9075b -5.5385b -4.9044 -13.7143 
SE 1.3138 1.8661 2.5391 9.7828 1.4041 1.7542 3.1398 9.0895 1.9572 2.6323 3.5833 8.8308 
WRATIO             
β 2.9794a 3.0568a 3.3736a 2.4474a 3.0641a 3.1490a 3.4446a 2.5910a 3.4488a 3.9094a 3.5644a 2.0547a 
SE 0.2025 0.2981 0.3188 0.7470 0.1862 0.2773 0.3114 0.6812 0.2201 0.3652 0.3403 0.7973 
DRATIO             
β 0.6203a 0.5561a 0.5952a 0.4576a 0.7028a 0.5847a 0.6710a 0.6474a 0.8154a 0.6449a 0.7415a 0.6342a 
SE 0.0296 0.0459 0.0446 0.1146 0.0320 0.0507 0.0536 0.1237 0.0471 0.0764 0.0700 0.1730 
TRISK             
β -25.59125a -20.6832a 26.0490a -32.1740b -26.0936a -21.8708a -26.0559a -31.1651b -23.4122a -21.8907a -22.3154a -21.7145 
SE 2.8150 3.6018 4.4266 13.7533 2.9178 3.8017 4.5614 13.9449 3.2367 4.4792 4.8834 14.9354 
INDRISK             
                     β 0.25791a 0.2728a 0.2229a 0.0764 0.0944a 0.1058a 0.1422a -0.0914 0.09725b 0.1228b 0.1432a 0.0149 
                 SE 0.0333 0.0476 0.0487 0.7329 0.0285 0.0406 0.0465 0.0936 0.2047 0.0533 0.3495 0.1370 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2 830.9300a 257.1900a 297.2400a 26.2500a 893.0900a 265.7200a 258.7600a 47.8100a 568.0300a 177.5100a 201.8900a 21.0800a 
Log Likelihood -5,334.2057 -2,565.0990 -2,210.4773 -411.6005 -4,999.9527 -2,395.5338 -2,068.6802 -391.5999 -3,705.6916 -1,665.259 -1,635.5298 -279.11423 
R2 0.3367 0.2738 0.3187 0.2308 0.3375 0.2544 0.3177 0.2738 0.3570 0.2819 0.3122 0.2317 
No. of “0” 176,035 40,484 88,389 47,162 154,854 34,066 77,569 43,219 119,436 24,446 59,330 35,660 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents multivariate panel logistic regression results without control variable for 6 
months (columns 1 to 4), 12 months (columns 5 to 8), and 24 months (columns 9 to 12) lagged periods across different size categories. The sampling period runs between 
1995-2016. We consider funds corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of AUM as small funds, those in the top 25 percentile as large funds, and the rest medium funds. If 
a fund liquidates in month t, the fund’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with liquidation 
likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina's R2. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in our sample, while 
No. of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations. 
 
Table 9: Multivariate Regression Models with Control Variables by Size Categories 
Lag Months 6 Months Lag 12 Months Lag 24 Months Lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variable All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds All Funds Small Funds Medium Funds Large Funds 
WRSIZE             
β -0.1885a 0.1148a 0.0469 0.1042 -0.1632a 0.0982a 0.1164b 0.0459 -0.1106a 0.1492a 0.0953c -0.0463 
SE 0.0180 0.0341 0.0542 0.1295 0.0186 0.0324 0.0516 0.1227 0.0225 0.0389 0.0530 0.1470 
GROWTH             
β -1.5921a -0.7721b -2.1490a 1.1107 -1.6886a -0.6989 -0.7544 1.3416 -1.8948a -1.7579a -0.1464 2.2651 
SE 0.2607 0.3242 0.5878 2.7518 0.3730 0.4734 0.9379 2.3665 0.4365 0.5888 1.0624 1.9581 
RETURN             
β -7.5856a -5.8748a -10.1098a -7.3356 -5.0110a -4.4482a -5.8788c -7.7427 -4.7534a -5.2080b -3.9814 -13.6738 
SE 1.3039 1.8615 2.5625 9.9175 1.3903 1.7256 3.1573 9.1010 1.8879 2.5053 3.5152 8.7349 
WRATIO             
β 2.9564a 3.0599a 3.3589a 2.6826a 3.0570a 3.1240a 3.4259a 2.8183a 3.3999a 3.6523a 3.5217a 2.1071b 
SE 0.2038 0.2965 0.3274 0.8028 0.1876 0.2680 0.3081 0.7156 0.2052 0.3429 0.3128 0.8543 
DRATIO             
β 0.5886a 0.5444a 0.6038a 0.4313a 0.6662a 0.5607a 0.6731a 0.6110a 0.7269a 0.5815a 0.6844a 0.5620a 
SE 0.0302 0.0451 0.0473 0.1243 0.0329 0.0477 0.0529 0.1290 0.0435 0.0721 0.0680 0.1844 
TRISK             
β -20.6694a -17.7186a -23.9185a -33.0417b -19.8760a -17.9085a -22.1927a -30.6602b -15.1501a -16.0579a -16.2325a -21.3327 
SE 2.7966 3.6844 4.4538 14.7039 2.8493 3.7823 4.5090 14.6883 2.9192 4.1919 4.4425 16.1625 
INDRISK             
β 0.2927a 0.2937a 0.2634a 0.0765 0.1540a 0.1129a 0.2110a -0.1598 0.2073a 0.1401a 0.2772a 0.0816 
SE 0.0363 0.0507 0.0545 0.1392 0.0318 0.0426 0.0518 0.1167 0.0390 0.0551 0.0610 0.1671 
AGE             
No. of “1” 928 507 366 55 889 487 348 54 655 341 277 37 
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β -0.1021b -0.0895 -0.0651 0.2159 -0.1707a -0.1354b -0.1964a 0.1939 -0.4105a -0.3076a -0.4651a 0.0685 
SE 0.0482 0.0661 0.0771 0.2234 0.0470 0.0644 0.0768 0.2119 0.0541 0.0859 0.0852 0.2648 
LUPD             
β -0.2394a -0.1617 -0.2822b -0.3020 -0.2330a -0.1765 -0.2487b -0.2995 -0.2107b -0.1526 -0.2271c -0.4839 
SE 0.0789 0.1086 0.1235 0.3309 0.0807 0.1110 0.1266 0.3337 0.0942 0.1398 0.1426 0.4235 
RNP             
β -0.0546 -0.0093 -0.0624 0.1135 -0.0531 0.0236 -0.0605 0.1288 -0.0382 0.0881 -0.1283c 0.3579b 
SE 0.0429 0.0638 0.0653 0.1406 0.0439 0.0654 0.0674 0.1403 0.0507 0.0828 0.0809 0.1600 
OTP             
β -0.1705c 0.0285 -0.2666c -1.1630b -0.1407 0.0360 -0.2460 -1.0638b -0.1689 -0.0974 -0.1566 -0.8129 
SE 0.0924 0.1194 0.1537 0.5261 0.0940 0.1222 0.1569 0.5266 0.1100 0.1589 0.1708 0.5442 
HWM             
β -0.2507a -0.0919 -0.0909 -0.1797 -0.2437a -0.0353 -0.0995 -0.2139 -0.2533a 0.0134 -0.1237 0.0072 
SE 0.7546 0.1064 0.1226 0.3213 0.0772 0.1094 0.1262 0.3234 0.0904 0.1413 0.1421 0.4407 
PCAP             
β -0.1118c -0.1474 -0.2346b -0.2311 -0.1287c -0.1679c -0.2545b -0.1934 -0.0907 -0.1020 -0.2146c 0.0594 
SE 0.0712 0.0966 0.1161 0.3034 0.0727 0.0991 0.1187 0.3064 0.0835 0.1242 0.1307 0.3493 
Investment Style Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2 928.2600a 287.4000a 315.2100a 48.2100a 987.8700a 310.5700a 323.9900a 69.4500a 790.4400a 242.5700a 294.1700a 52.5500a 
Log Likelihood -5,277.6453 -2,556.1298 -2,187.5128 -401.96548 -4942.7056 -2,384.7241 -2,042.4571 -382.44704 -3,639.2845 -1650.7299 -1,603.2006 -268.3466 
R2 0.338 0.2794 0.3399 0.3273 0.3389 0.2571 0.3360 0.3448 0.3586 0.2890 0.3351 0.3293 
No. of “0” 175,814 40,453 88,356 47,005 154,673 34,045 77,542 43,086 119,316 24,444 59,316 35,556 
No. of “1” 927 507 365 55 888 487 347 54 654 341 276 37 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents multivariate panel logistic regression results with control variable for 6 months 
(columns 1 to 4), 12 months (columns 5 to 8), and 24 months (columns 9 to 12) lagged periods across different size categories. The sampling period runs between 1995-2016. 
We consider funds corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of AUM as small funds, those in the top 25 percentile as large funds, and the rest medium funds. If a fund 
liquidates in month t, the fund’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with liquidation likelihood 
and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina's R2. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in our sample, while No. of “0” 
counts the number of “non-failure” observations.     
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Table 10: Multivariate Regression Models with interaction between Fund Size and Investment Style 
Variable Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
Lag Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
WRSIZE 0.0995a  0.0272 0.0954a  0.0259 0.1117a  0.0305 0.0914a  0.0279 0.0962a  0.0268 0.1284a  0.0296 
GROWTH -1.0004a  0.2743 -0.6367c 0.4243 -0.9777c 0.5586 -0.9995a  0.2777 -0.6932c 0.4158 -1.2185b  0.5037 
RETURN -7.1919a  1.4218 -4.6792a  1.4683 -5.0422b 2.0438 -7.2195a  1.4131 -4.8215a  1.4580 -4.7379b 1.9515 
WRATIO 3.1406a  0.2113 3.2261a  0.1956 3.6314a  0.2348 3.1486a  0.2115 3.2079a  0.1941 3.4812a  0.2098 
DRATIO 0.5727a  0.0312 0.6232a  0.0339 0.6596a  0.0500 0.5634a  0.0315 0.6100a  0.0342 0.6158a  0.0452 
TRISK -22.7461a  2.7629 -23.2409a  2.8648 -20.666a  3.2359 -20.768a  2.8051 -19.9839a  2.8519 -15.9495a  2.9695 
INDRISK 0.2425a  0.0319 0.0945a  0.0279 0.1110a  0.0384 0.2694a  0.0358 0.1378a  0.0316 0.1931a  0.0387 
Medium Funds (MF) -0.1512  0.3319 -0.1557  0.3342 -0.4857  0.4180 -0.1831  0.3326 -0.1697  0.3349 -0.3702  0.3892 
Large Funds (LF) -2.2117a  0.6461 -2.5554a  0.7638 -2.2992a  0.8041 -2.1559a  0.6471 -2.4989a  0.1647 -2.1568a  0.7778 
Dedicated Short Bias  -0.1700 0.4629 -0.1005  0.4617 -0.1672  0.5911 -0.2444  0.4662 -0.1740  0.0464 -0.2949  0.5343 
Equity Market Neutral  0.4804c  0.2994 0.6039b 0.3024 0.6579c 0.3829 0.3937  0.3011 0.4971  0.3041 0.4592  0.3479 
Event Driven  0.3966  0.3069 0.2948  0.3118 0.1029  0.3947 0.3377  0.3077 0.2506  0.3124 0.1091  0.3585 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  0.0049  0.3980 -0.0354  0.3991 -0.5821  0.5339 -0.0822  0.3992 -0.1069  0.4001 -0.5525  0.4905 
Global Macro  0.5052c  0.3101 0.5391c  0.3135 0.5704  0.3956 0.3634  0.3132 0.4079  0.3167 0.4683  0.3631 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  0.3566  0.2829 0.4155  0.2844 0.3431  0.3528 0.2990  0.2842 0.3726  0.2855 0.3563  0.3231 
Multi-Strategy  0.3093  0.3173 0.4004  0.3184 0.1066  0.4094 0.2214  0.3193 0.3324  0.3206 0.1116  0.3735 
MF × Dedicated Short Bias  -0.9724  0.6991 -0.9584  0.7009 -0.3423  0.8154 -0.9101  0.6999 -0.9117  0.7015 -0.2977  0.7598 
MF × Equity Market Neutral  -0.9490b  0.3838 -0.9396b 0.3899 -0.7374  0.4903 -0.9159b 0.3842 -0.9359b  0.3905 -0.7289c  0.4538 
MF × Event Driven  -1.3494a  0.3967 -1.3339a  0.4083 -0.9763c 0.5105 -1.2493a  0.3972 -1.2787a  0.4087 -0.8834c  0.4538 
MF × Fixed Income Arbitrage  -0.2943  0.5069 -0.2099  0.5092 0.5642  0.6551 -0.2052  0.5077 -0.1606  0.5099 0.4475  0.6125 
MF × Global Macro  -0.8870b 0.4049 -0.8405b  0.4110 -0.7517  0.5234 -0.8245b 0.4074 -0.8032b 0.4150 -0.7051  0.4896 
MF × Long/Short Equity Hedge  -0.9893a  0.3425 -0.9830a  0.3458 -0.6491  0.4317 -0.9173a  0.3431 -0.9324a  0.3464 -0.6160  0.4025 
MF × Multi-Strategy  -0.8513b  0.4050 -0.9106b 0.4102 -0.5305  0.5272 -0.8309b  0.4057 -0.9288b 0.4109 -0.5814  0.4934 
LF × Dedicated Short Bias  4.4629a  1.2865 4.4011a  1.3600 6.3139a  1.6576 4.5065a  1.2881 4.5449a  1.3569 6.3981a  1.4729 
LF × Equity Market Neutral  -1.5013  1.1937 -1.0603  1.2627 -1.3339  1.3006 -1.5765  1.1942 -1.1301  1.2629 -1.2421  1.2737 
LF × Event Driven  -0.2909  0.7443 0.2109  0.8513 -0.7871  1.0091 -0.2438  0.7447 0.2453  0.8513 -0.6467  0.9821 
LF × Fixed Income Arbitrage  -0.0459  0.9097 0.4415  0.9982 -0.3813  1.3505 -0.0176  0.9099 0.4438  0.9981 -0.3573  1.3209 
LF × Global Macro  -0.1075  0.7279 0.2954  0.8367 -0.2722  0.9027 -0.0201  0.7286 0.3882  0.8369 -0.108 0 0.8698 
LF × Long/Short Equity Hedge  -0.2499  0.6794 0.1641  0.7936 -0.3971  0.8459 -0.2737  0.6799 0.1314  0.7338 -0.3485  0.8204 
LF × Multi-Strategy  0.0515  0.7386 0.405  0.8449 0.1881  0.9182 0.0786  0.7401 0.4326  0.8459 0.3519  0.8865 
AGE       -0.0652  0.0486 -0.1459a  0.0478 -0.3933a  0.0549 
LUPD       -0.2160a  0.0790 -0.2063b 0.0808 -0.1939b 0.0942 
RNP       -0.0231  0.0427 -0.093 0 0.0436 0.0044  0.0501 
OTP       -0.1349  0.0921 -0.1142  0.0939 -0.1645  0.0941 
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HWM       -0.0857  0.0777 -0.0648  0.0799 -0.0405  0.0941 
PCAP       -0.1807b 0.0718 -0.1973a  0.0735 -0.1396c  0.0845 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2 1,018.4500a  1,063.7600a  638.4000a  1,039.2800a  1,101.5900a  877.6200a  
Log Likelihood -5,176.3722  -4,841.5364  -3,568.6022  -5,158.9262  -4,821.6450  -3,536.5679  
R2 0.3917  0.3964  0.4309  0.3923  0.3917  0.4297  
No. of “0” 176,035  154,854  119,436  175,814  154,673  119,316  
No. of “1” 928  889  655  927  888  654  
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents multivariate panel logistic regression results with interaction terms (between 
fund size and the investment style) for 6 months, 12 months, and 24 months lagged periods. Size category “Small Funds” and investment style “Convertible Arbitrage” are 
considered reference groups, and thus main and interaction effects are reported for medium funds, large funds and remaining investment styles. Results are reported 
separately for multivariate models without control variables (columns 2 to 7) and with control variables (columns 8 to 13). The sampling period runs between 1995-2016. We 
consider funds corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of AUM as small funds, those in the top 25 percentile as large funds, and the rest medium funds. If a fund liquidates 
in month t, the fund’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that month t and ‘0’ otherwise. β is the regression coefficient, SE is standard error of respective coefficients and R2 is 
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in our sample, while No. of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations. 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
